Russia has long been waging operations against democracies using all of the asymmetric tools ASD tracks—information manipulation, cyberattacks, malign finance, civil society subversion, and state economic coercion. The Kremlin’s geographic scope in conducting operations to undermine democracy continues to expand and its tactics continue to evolve. Find ASD’s work on Russia’s attempts to interfere in democracies on this page.
Twitter Release Reveals the Kremlin’s News Impersonation Game
On June 18, Democrats on the House Intelligence Committee releasedaround 1,100 names of Twitter accounts linked to the Internet Research Agency (IRA), which is the official name of the Russian troll farm indictedby Special Counsel Robert Mueller for [...]
From Nord Stream to Novichok: Kremlin Propaganda on Google’s Front Page
On May 24, an international team of investigators from the Netherlands, Australia, Malaysia, and Ukraine announced that a Russian anti-aircraft missile was directly responsible for the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (MH17). The following da [...]
The Syria Swarm: How pro-Kremlin Accounts Influence Western Public Opinion
As the United States, Britain, and France launched targeted airstrikes against suspected chemical weapons sites in Syria on April 13, U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis predicted that there would be “a significant disinformation campaign over th [...]
It’s Not Just Facebook: Countering Russia’s Social Media Offensive
Russian influence operations exploit the vulnerabilities of social media platforms to disseminate false narratives and amplify divisive content in order to undermine democracies, divide societies, and weaken Western alliances. In conducting these o [...]
So What Did We Learn? Looking Back on Four Years of Russia’s Cyber-Enabled “Active Measures”
Americans continue to investigate, deliberate, and wallow in the aftermath of Russia’s rebirth of “Active Measures” designed to defeat their adversaries through the “force of politics rather than the politics of force.” Kremlin interference in the 2 [...]
Extremist Content and Russian Disinformation Online: Working with Tech to Find Solutions
Statement Prepared for the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism A decade ago, al Qaeda in Iraq littered YouTube with violent videos. A few years later, Twitter became a playground for al Shabaab’s violent tir [...]
Insinuation and Influence: How the Kremlin Targets Americans Online
The objective of Kremlin influence operations, part of a larger set of tactics and strategies known as active measures, is to make the target population more amenable to Kremlin wants and desires. They achieve this either by gaining a sympathetic he [...]