It has been well documented that Russian state media outlets have developed various ways to circumvent EU sanctions to continue reaching audiences in Europe. This often includes the use of mirror sites—identical copies of Russian state media websites hosted on unblocked domains. This strategy extends to social media platforms, where RT and Sputnik use proxy accounts and other workarounds to bypass bans and geo-blocking placed on official accounts and channels. Russian state media openly acknowledges this practice: In one of its mirror Telegram channels, RT Deutsch, RT’s German-language outlet, mocked EU attempts to block its content using a famous Soviet cartoon “Well, Just You Wait!” inspired by the US animated series “Tom and Jerry”. In the meme, RT depicts the wolf from the Soviet series as a censor (“Zensur”) who is helplessly trying to catch the hare, symbolizing RT Deutsch’s mirror pages (“Spiegelseiten”). The message is clear: the European Union’s efforts to block RT and Sputnik, enacted in 2022 after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, are hopelessly destined to fail.   

To systematically explore the sanctions evasion tactics of both RT and Sputnik, we analyzed all links posted in 2024 by the official X and Telegram accounts of RT and Sputnik in seven languages (Arabic, English, French, German, Portuguese, Serbian, and Spanish). Of those languages, all but German had both a dedicated RT and Sputnik outlet, though RT’s Portuguese outlet (RT Brasil) simply translates relevant RT content into Portuguese. In addition, Sputnik also has two outlets targeting audiences in Africa, one in English (Sputnik Africa) and one in French (Sputnik Afrique). Across all studied accounts, we discovered a total of 308 links leading to mirror websites, duplicate or near duplicate Telegram or X accounts, or podcasts with RT and Sputnik content that are freely available on popular streaming platforms. Upon assembling these links into an interactive dashboard, we observed the following patterns and tactics that RT and Sputnik employ to avoid EU content bans: 

  • Predictably, RT and Sputnik accounts associated with languages whose primary audiences reside in the EU were more likely to link to mirrored content than those whose primary audiences reside outside the EU. We observed a substantial number of mirror websites, alternative social media accounts, and podcasts in German, Spanish, English, and French, but substantially fewer links in Arabic, Serbian, and Portuguese. Since RT and Sputnik are not blocked in Serbia, the Middle East, or Brazil, there is clearly less need to employ circumvention techniques. It is also important to note that while Sputnik Africa and Sputnik Afrique broadcast primarily for the African continent, they also likely target diaspora communities in the EU. 
  • RT and Sputnik also produce podcasts, possibly to reach younger audiences and news markets that heavily rely on audio content, such as in Africa. In addition to the likely automated network of RT Deutsch podcasts that ASD discovered prior to the 2025 German Bundestag elections, our analysis also revealed several professionally made Sputnik podcasts in English (26 links) and French (29 links) tailored for African audiences. These podcasts are available on major music streaming platforms, such as Apple and Spotify, and on smaller specialized websites, such as Podcast Addict and Castbox. Not all of the podcasts indicate a Sputnik affiliation in their titles or descriptions. For example, a listener learns that African Currents is “proudly presented by Sputnik Africa”, but only if they listen to the host’s introductory remarks. 
  • Across all analyzed RT and Sputnik language services, there were more accounts that replicated all or part of RT and Sputnik’s official accounts on Telegram than any other analyzed social media platform. Some of these channels are blocked in the EU, while others are still available, including an English-language Telegram channel dedicated to aggregated news bytes from both RT and Sputnik. In a seemingly new tactic, some Telegram channels featured a link that automatically allows users to join alternative Telegram channels of RT or Sputnik without having to search for and add them manually. We found such links both for English- and German-language Russian state media content. 
  • RT Arabic’s journalists are very active on Telegram. We discovered at least 34 channels that belong to individual journalists affiliated with RT Arabic. Thus, while RT Arabic’s official Telegram account is not available in the EU, EU citizens can still follow the channels of individual journalists who regularly share RT Arabic’s content. This creates a potential loophole that allows RT Arabic to circumvent content blocking and continue targeting Arabic speaking communities in Europe. 

This report yet again demonstrates the challenges of enforcing the current EU ban on RT and Sputnik. Both outlets use their official social media accounts to alert their followers to new alternative links or channels, allowing them to constantly stay a step ahead of regulators and moderators. Additionally, due to the focus on text- and video-based content, RT and Sputnik’s podcasts have gone largely unnoticed by European regulators and monitors. The task of tracking the spread of Russian-affiliated podcasts is complicated by the fact that many of these podcasts avoid explicitly mentioning their affiliation with Russian state media (at least in published descriptions), making it hard to detect them, particularly on smaller sites. 

Tom never caught Jerry, and the Wolf never caught the Hare, yet their constant pursuit kept the show running. Admitting that a complete ban is impossible, while still staying vigilant and close to the target, is perhaps the best tactic in an ever adapting and ever-changing Russian propaganda digital environment. 

The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the views of the author alone.