Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei has sought to guarantee access to Baltic states’ 5G infrastructure by whatever means available. The Lithuanian intelligence service’s 2019 threat assessment did not name Huawei in its unclassified publication, but alluded instead to “Chinese companies” as vectors for intelligence operations. The report mentions tactics targeting influential officials by “giving gifts, paying for trips to China, covering expenses of training and courses,” and other inducements to support Chinese positions. In February 2019, Huawei sent its VP of cybersecurity to the region to meet with unnamed government officials, but did not release details of who he contacted or what proposals and incentives were discussed. Although Lithuanian law stipulates that only firms from NATO member states or allied countries are permitted to bid for projects classified as important to national security, two of Lithuania’s three main telecom companies, as well as the public broadcaster, already use some Huawei components, and the state-owned energy company is exploring Huawei involvement in its refurbished electrical meters. Under PRC law, Huawei is obligated to participate in national intelligence work, has been credibly accused of cooperation with PRC intelligence agencies, and is owned ultimately by a trade union entity likely controlled by the CCP.