



Policy Blueprint for Countering Authoritarian Interference in Democracies
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LAURA ROSENBERGER: Thank you for your patience and thanks so much for joining us this morning really early. Good start to a Tuesday morning. I'm Laura Rosenberger, I'm the co-director of the Alliance for Securing Democracy at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Along with my colleague Jamie Fly and colleagues in the room, our president Karen Donfried, I'm really happy to welcome you here. I'm going to keep my remarks really short so you can hear from Senator Klobuchar and our distinguished panel this morning. But just a brief couple of words on the Alliance and why we're here today. We're a program that launched about a year ago as a bipartisan and transatlantic initiative to develop strategies to defend against and deter foreign interference in our democracy. We believe deeply in the bipartisanship of this issue; we believe that our democracy is something that should transcend party lines and in fact because so much of the strategy that is aimed at attacking us is actually trying to divide us from each other, it is actually strategic that we respond in a bipartisan way. That is why we are very happy to have Senator Klobuchar with us this morning. She has been a leader in the Senate on really thinking about some of the tough issues, whether it's how we tackle questions of political advertising online or how we better secure our elections infrastructure. These are areas where we've seen the vulnerabilities in our democracy exposed, and she's worked across party lines to develop legislation and other strategies to begin to close those vulnerabilities -- so really appreciate her leadership on these issues. She's going to give some opening remarks and then we're going to have a panel discussion with her and former Homeland Security Secretary Mike Chertoff, who we're really honored to have as a member of our advisory council, who has been a leader on cybersecurity issues, election security issues, as well as many other areas. And moderating that conversation will be another one of our distinguished advisory council members, Michael Morell, who is the former deputy director and acting director of the CIA who has worked on a wide range of intelligence issues and has also been a leader on these issues. After that we'll have a conversation about the report that we're releasing today with some of the recommendations that we believe, in the work we've done at the Alliance, are

necessary to better secure our democracy. But look forward to Senator Klobuchar and our panel discussion setting the stage, and with that thank you so much Senator Klobuchar

SENATOR AMY KLOBUCHAR: Alright, well, thank you everyone for your patience and thank you Laura for this incredible work that you do. And I am sorry for being late, I had a breakfast and got in some traffic, but before that I got in a 1AM last night. I was visiting Senator McCain, and was in Sedona. Anyone that has made that trek knows it is quite a trek. And so I am just happy to be back here and I thought that might be a good way to start – I will make some abbreviated remarks here. And that is: I read Senator McCain's book, which I highly recommend. And made sure I finished it right at 7AM when I went down there. And there is this chapter called Nyet, and it is about just the history of him advising four administrations, Democratic and Republican, about what he saw coming from Russia. And it culminated in all of this, in this election. I think it is worth looking at the history of it. And you know from the great work you do at the Alliance, about the history of it with other countries as well. And your last report with the 27 other countries and the kind of security breaches and the kind of interventions that we've seen from their country and how this is actually part of a major, major effort that has been going on for a while. So what you do in response will, well in his book actually Senator McCain talks about the many times he went to Ukraine, and including being at Maidan on that incredible moment where the people were filling the street. And he later returned there with Lindsey and me on an amazing visit I will never forget, that he also mentions in the book. On New Year's Eve we did a week trip to the Baltics and went to Lithuania, Latvia, Georgia, and Estonia. And President Poroshenko took us to the front line in this like blacked out helicopter, and you know about those Mike. And we ended up on the front line and Poroshenko had all the Ukrainian TV there to show American support right after President Trump had gotten elected. American support for their efforts for democracy. And he presented on live TV, which John notes in his book, he presented an assault weapon, some kind of huge rifle, to Senator McCain. Then he went to Lindsey and gave him a pistol and I saw him coming my way and I thought what is this. And he gave me two daggers; that's a true story! And Senator McCain kept trying to hold onto his weapon and the Navy has since confiscated every single one of them and he keeps saying "What happened! What happened to it?" In any case, in his book when he talks about why we keep doing this work – because oftentimes you go on maybe a codel and you stand up for democracy or a democratic movement or you stand up against aggression from a tyrant – and he said this simple word: "Even the smallest gestures in support of the hardest causes mean something to those struggling in them." And I think that is part of what America has done and what you are doing by being here today, by the way, and listening to us. Is to have us understanding that our country is about more than just some of the work we do every day and passing laws and getting things done. We have this spirit of embracing democracy and being the beacon of democracy for the rest of the world. And that's why this invasion that we saw in the election in 2016 is so concerning. And one of the things I have been talking about a lot, as you'll see when we do our discussion, is that yes we must finish the Mueller investigation and keep looking back at what happened. But for me, the major reason to do that is to make sure that this doesn't happen again and that we change how we handle these elections going forward, and how we respond to them more immediately so we can get the information out so they can't mess around with us again. We've certainly seen, as we'll probably talk about in the

discussion, other countries do that because they've been doing this for 25 years where they've had to respond to Russian interference. So the first thing is of course securing our election equipment, and that's the bill Senator Lankford and I have along with Senator Graham and Senator Harris, and Senator Burr, and Warner, and Heinrich, and Collins. So it's a pretty good group. And that's called the Secure Elections Act and that's about sharing information better and also getting money out their to the states. We already got \$380 million out in the last election and a good part of that has already gone out the states. So it's not like funny money. I'm sorry, I meant in the last budget. We got that money out there. Second thing, is to do something about how these ads have been run – whether they were purchased by Rubles or not. And that's the Honest Ads Act. Senator McCain talked about that yesterday when I was there. The progress we're making for some reason suddenly Mark Zuckerberg and the Facebook and Twitter, they're all supporting our bill! I wonder why. Well they are. And so, I don't care how we get the support...we got it. So it is time to move and get that Bill done. We want to really build some Republican support. And one of the things you'll see me talk about today is the need to have this be not just about the Hillary-Trump election, right? Because that is really hard to kind of get that support. How do you do that? Well one, you can talk about the need to secure our elections going forward. But two, the other way, is to mention that this actually took place in the Republican primary. And there was an NYU law professor, Ryan Goodman, who when we had our panel last time talked about the impact that this Russian buying and also some of the trolling and some of the other things that was going on affected the Republican primary, to the detriment actually of Senator Rubio, who I remember said, "Next time it could be the other party and the other candidate." and I think that's something that is important to emphasize as we look at those issues. That it's not just one election, one party, versus the other. And to set the stage for our panel I'll end with this, it's kind of a fun quote because it's always great to quote Joseph Stalin. So, in 1923, Stalin was, who is then the General Secretary of the Soviet communists, is asked about a vote in the Central Committee in his party. He said that he was unconcerned about the vote. After all, he explained, who voted is "completely unimportant," what was "extraordinarily important" was who would count the votes and how. So sadly 95 years later it seems that we are back at square one with the Russians and potentially, as you know, other countries as we move forward, trying to influence our elections. And that is just really inimical to what our founding fathers had wanted. They started our democracy breaking off from the influence of a foreign power, and here we are now dealing with it again and so I think we'd better listen to some of the wisdom from those who started our democracy in terms of what they thought foreign stood for. And we can't go backward. Whether you're a four star general, a fourth grade teacher, or a computer engineer at Foursquare, this should be an issue that unites us all. So thank you everyone.

First Panel

MIKE MORELL: Senator, thank you very much, it was an absolutely terrific kick-off. Thanks to everybody for being here. I will tell you that I am deeply honored to be up here with two great Americans, and with two people who are so passionate about protecting our democracy from foreign interference and who've done so much to bring attention to the issue and have done so much to try to do something about it. So, thank you guys:

KLOBUCHAR: It also gets me out of our leadership meeting on Tuesday morning, so I'm really psyched to be here myself — don't tell anyone that.

[Laughter]

MORELL: So I'd like to start by asking both of you to put Russia and 2016 in context, and then we'll move beyond that, because I know it's important to move beyond that. Senator McCain called it an act of war. Jim Clapper, in his book that just came out, said that in his fifteen years of intelligence work, nothing disturbed him more than what he saw in 2015, 2016, because it was a fundamental attack on the pillars of our system, a fundamental attack on our values. I'd just love to get both of your perspective on how you think about Russia and 2016. Senator, can we start with you?

KLOBUCHAR: Sure. I see it, again, as a case where Vladimir Putin was trying to show his muscle, which he loves to do, and at the same time, he has his own domestic issues, right, where he has to keep his power, and one of those is to create enemies and to show that they can do anything, and certainly this was part of that. It also has the other advantage of if you disrupt our model of democracy, it shows the rest of the world that not only are we not foolproof, that we have our own divides and problems. And actually the stuff that they did, you know, there may be a lot of focus on John Podesta's emails, which were, of course, a factor in — look, can you imagine having your campaign chair in a presidential election have their emails splattered all over the place. Those things happen, but what was, to me, equally interesting and equally scary that I didn't know about until later, was just those efforts to divide and disrupt. Whether they were going on the side against the North Dakota oil pipeline there, of course Russia has its own interests in energy and putting up ads and notices for meetings, or whether it was taking on racial divides in our own country, and they certainly showed the precursors for that when they did the, they actually paid for in rubles, those ads that showed African-American faces during the 2016 election, that literally — these were criminal — they had pictures up and it said, why wait in line? If you want to vote for Hillary, text 84537, or something like that. That's a crime, because they're telling people that they can vote in another way. And so what you saw was this disruption that Russia was doing, in addition to arguably trying to weigh in against one side or another. But it's the disruption thing that can go on no matter what time you are, even if you're not in an election, if you're trying to disrupt on issues. So that's what I saw happening and that's why I think it's so important that we respond. If you see it as Senator McCain did and I do as an act of warfare, well, then we have to start looking at where are we putting resources, you know,

getting the Honest Ads money out there – that was three percent of the cost of one aircraft carrier. So if you see it as a kind of cyberwar, then you have to be able to respond not only in kind, but you have to be able to put the money in to protect yourself.

MORELL: Mr. Secretary?

CHERTOFF: This is part of a strategy that the Russians have, and it's actually not new. Those of you who remember the 50s and 60s, or who've studied the history even earlier than that, when it was the Soviet Union, information operations were a key part of their strategy. Efforts to subvert here in the United States, they were less successful because they didn't have the tools that we now have, but the impulse was the same. Also, if you've looked at what's going on in Europe over the last ten years, the Russians have been very active in using a whole series of tools, not just social media, but money, conventional media, infiltration, in order to try to move countries, particularly in Eastern and Central Europe, back into their orbit. So this is something that should not surprise us, and part of it is the Russians, as the senator said, find it a useful distraction. But part of it is also the concern they have that we advocate and we demonstrate the advantages of a free system, and there's a concern they have that maybe their population would begin to see the attraction in that. So the easiest way to fight that is to basically show, no, democracies don't work, there's a lot of dissension, there's a lot of failure, and that, in their mind, I think, lures the population away from having any impulse to imitate us. So we have to look at this as a strategic issue, and I think that the point that's really key here, as the senator said is, it's not just about our election time. If the Russians or other countries can create social division by encouraging people on differing sides of an issue to dial up the degree of outrage and even to conflict with each other and fight each other, that really is a home run for them, because then our will and our ability to act with unity of effort is compromised by internal dissension. And that, I think, is the long-term game plan for the Russians and perhaps other malign influences.

MORELL: I'd like to ask both of you to, is the U.S. government — Mr. Secretary, you can take the Executive Branch piece of this, and Senator Klobuchar, you can take the Congressional piece of this — are we organized to deal with this problem?

CHERTOFF: I would say the answer is no, and part of that is because, really since the end of the Cold War, we haven't viewed this as kind of a relevant issue anymore. But part of it is, frankly, the U.S. government is always uncomfortable dealing overtly with the issue of promoting and fighting with respect to ideas in the United States. There are all kinds of rules about whether government agencies can spend money on things that might be regarded as efforts to persuade the domestic population. So I don't think we've ever organized ourselves, at least at home, to have some kind of unity of effort with respect to information operations. Now, years ago, we had unity of effort overseas. We had, you know, various kinds of communications organs, there's Voice of America, which was doing work like this, the Information Agency, but we've not wanted to do that at home, and I think that's created a gap in our security.

MORELL: Senator?

KLOBUCHAR: I was thinking, I was in Canada last weekend, you know, having a goodwill tour, for some reason, with Senator Crapo and Blunt, 'cause I head up the American-Canadian interparliamentary group. And we went as a visit, as a museum, this isn't some big secret, known in the past, but the Canadians had this Cold War nuclear bunker, I don't know if you've ever seen it, it's unbelievable, outside of Ottawa, and they're now, like, having birthday parties in it, don't ask that, there was a birthday party going on. But it was unbelievable, this had been going on since the beginning of the Cold War, and they had, it was named after one of their prime ministers, and we were afraid they were gonna lock the three of us down there, but they did not, and the point of it is when you go in those rooms, everything was preserved: these computers from the 50s and 60s and 70s in this huge room that would now fit in your pocket. But you thought the mentality of it, they had a morgue down there for the thousand people that would be safe down there, as our country thought about what was going on during that time, and now you get to the present, this bunker isn't that helpful at all for where we are, but for the present, that means something else. That means making sure we do everything, and put the resources into protecting our cyberspace, and thinking about how we're gonna respond. So the first thing I'd say from the Congressional standpoint, Mike, is sanctions, and making sure that we're fierce about that, and you mean it, and that we aren't, don't equivocate about it, and obviously under both administrations now we've been doing some more things with sanctions, but I think that is a response. But the second response, is, I'd say, more subtle and just as important. And that is putting the resources, like the Secure Elections Act, into protecting our democracy, and really going even farther in terms of helping our businesses and others that are victims of cyberattack. And I remember talking to Admiral Mullen at a prayer breakfast years ago right after we had that PIPA/SOPA fight, does anyone here — oh, you guys are so young, you don't even know about this — but that was about protecting intellectual property on the internet, and there's the huge pushback by Google, simply allowed the government to take down websites that were stealing stuff, and it sort of ended in a big media disaster, as people of goodwill, including myself and others, and Senator Leahy and a bunch of Republicans were trying to push this, I remember he came up to me at the prayer breakfast and goes, "oh man, this is gonna set us back on our security issues as well." So we've got to start looking at this. People's privacy is not protected if we don't invest in security when we're in the middle of cyber war with foreign powers. And we have got to be able to find ways to protect our security, and that means revamping how we look at our spending on security, on the defense side as well as on the intelligence side.

MORELL: The current Director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats, gave a speech three weeks ago, in which he said, look, the Russian activities that we saw in 2014, 2015, 2016 haven't stopped, they've continued. And in the last few weeks, a number of lawmakers up here on both sides of the aisle have expressed concerns that we haven't done enough to protect ourselves. And Senator, I think it goes back to what you said, we're kinda stuck in that 2016 mindset, by the politics of that. How do we get beyond that?

KLOBUCHAR: Well, I've been really heartened recently, the Intelligence Committee — the Senate side, here — obviously has been on this for a while. Senator Burr and Warner working

together on a nonpartisan basis, which has been much appreciated. And now we need to expand that beyond the Intelligence Committee, which was obviously looking at the past and what happened, and is doing a series of reports and things like that, and will continue, of course, to be incredibly important, and if we see, as Director Coats has predicted, an emboldened Russia, and not to mention other countries that may mess around with us. But what I've seen recently that has made me heartened about this is Senator Grassley, for really the first time, has done some committee-wide hearings, before it was simply in the subcommittee, with Senator Graham, who's been such a leader of this, as well as Senator Whitehouse, the same, and so we are now starting to have, we had, I thought, a very good hearing last week on this, Senator Blunt has taken over the Rules Committee, and he and I are the ranking members of that, and we actually have jurisdiction over elections. So we had our first hearing with secretaries of state, which, of course, has been lacking in terms of bringing together some of these state election officials to talk about the Secure Elections Act changes that Senator Lankford and I have made and all the things we should be doing going forward. So all those things to me just are tea leaves, a bit, that there's some change here. The fact that Senator McConnell and Schumer agreed to put the \$380 million in the budget and get that out, the fact that the Congress was so ferocious about the sanctions. I mean, there are things happening that are different, and I think the further we get away from that election, as much as it's important to look back and the Mueller investigation to continue, because we still don't know all the facts, but it makes it easier for Republicans to come on board and say, yeah, we can't let this happen to our democracy, so all of those things give me hope.

MORELL: I'd like to ask both of you — and Senator, you talked about this a little bit in your kickoff keynote — kinda step back and say, what are the three or four or five things that we absolutely have to do as a nation in order to deal with this strategic challenge that we're facing here. Secretary, do you want to start?

CHERTOFF: Sure. I think one of them is hardcore cybersecurity, and that means protecting the infrastructure that we use to manage our elections. Now that's voting machines, obviously, but it also involves the databases we use for voter registration, and of course, the process of counting and transmitting the results. All these are areas of vulnerability. I mean, I love the Stalin quote — not because I love Stalin, but because it captures the —

KLOBUCHAR: Oh, that's gonna be quoted out of context by someone else here.

CHERTOFF: — But rather because it succinctly captures the mindset of a Stalinist, which is, it's who calls the result that matters, it's not what the actual result is. So we have to do, you know, the election infrastructure. I also think we need to navigate a fairly complicated set of issues around the content that has been put on the internet by these troll factories and by botnets. We don't want to attack the First Amendment, and that means people — particularly Americans — advocate or amplify or say certain things which are offensive and even wrong, but they have the right to say it under the First Amendment. On the other hand, people don't have the right to impersonate somebody else, we can regulate the ability of foreigners, and particularly foreign governments, to purchase ads, we can make sure people don't use botnets to artificially

influence the algorithms of certain search engines. So I do think we need to have a comprehensive plan that respects the First Amendment but also drives at some of the tactics which have been used to distort social media. And there I have to say, I think, that finally, the social media companies have woken up to the fact that this is a serious credibility problem for them, and they need to get on board with using some of their technological know-how to do this. The last thing, though, I think that we need to do, and this is the hardest, is to look inside ourselves. The Russians could not plant seeds of dissention if there was not fertile ground. And a lot of this has to do with the fact that we've now treated disagreements in the political sphere as conflict. And it's, to be honest, getting worse. Used to be the case that if you disagreed with someone, you might argue vigorously, but then, you know, you could go out and also have dinner with them and have friendly relationships and even have family interaction. That's getting harder and harder. This is partly an issue of education. It's partly an issue of leadership. And one of things that's very good about doing what the German Marshall Fund's doing on a bipartisan basis, is it walks the walks and not just talks the talk about being able to act with unity. And let me just bring you back to this one point. I remember, I was head of the criminal division on September 11, 2001, and I remember coming up to the Hill a couple of days after that event — with nobody else but Bob Mueller, who's then Director of the FBI — and I think almost everybody in Congress was in the House chamber, and we talked about what had happened, and what we foresaw happening, and what we were doing, and the spirit that I was imbued with from that session was, this is about us as Americans, not about Republicans and Democrats, because it wasn't Republican or Democrats who died on September 11, it was Americans, as well as other foreigners. And we need to recapture that spirit when we're talking about our political system, and not just our lives and our property.

MORELL: Senator?

KLOBUCHAR: Very well said. I thought I'd take on a little bit the, and agree with, Secretary Chertoff on the social media piece of this. I know people in my state that see these for so long we just believed everything we read, and you wanna do that, you're people of goodwill, it doesn't matter which side you're on, you've got these things. And one, I think the first thing we need is that education effort, that, you know, people that, when I went on that trip to Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania, they've been through this for 25 years, you know. In Estonia, they simply moved a statue from a public square to a cemetery, of a Russian fighter, and then that triggered Russia cutting off their internet, so you could only use your Iphone on the top of a hill or something like that, which is kinda like being in farmland in Minnesota, another story. So I think that you've seen this and their citizens have seen this, and they've been able to get through a bunch of elections where there's even, you know, slates of Russian candidates, and they see through it and they know what it is. Well, that wasn't true of our population in this last election, and I agree that we're gonna have to balance the First Amendment but just to give you the facts on the volume of this: In 2016, \$1.4 billion was spent on political advertising. Now that's not all fake stuff, but that's how much was spent. And when you look into the projections for the 2020 presidential, they're projecting \$3-4 billion dollars, is going to migrate over there. Alright? You can simply have no — that's what's right now — we have no rules of the road in place from the government. We really don't. You can have foreign contribution rules that are kind of in place,

sometimes campaigns feel somewhat compelled because of the disclaimer rules, and so now what's happening is these sites, individually, which I truly appreciate, are doing it, and so we had our first little bit of a breakthrough, probably no one noticed with all the news, but in the Virginia Senate race, that candidate, Corey Stewart, I think that's his name, there were some ads run for him during the primary that were pretty suspicious, and they had some weird disclaimer on them, but Facebook has a new policy in place, so they have an archive of these things. So not four months later or a year later, people were able to see those ads. The primary happened, and probably wouldn't have changed the results, but it's gonna allow the journalists and other campaigns to look at those ads and say, where'd those come from? What are those? Where's the money spent on those? That's what we have to do, because otherwise you have no transparency in the democracy. If you have foreign governments or anyone able to put divisive ads in certain areas or on certain people's feeds and no one ever sees them and they just vanish. That is exactly what was going on in 2016, and what's going to continue. The fact that the biggest platform, Facebook, and then, of course, Twitter — another major platform — is starting to display those ads, that's called disclosure, and requiring disclaimers, you can see who paid for them, that's going to be a major help, because I have much more faith in the competitive system of entrepreneurship. Opposing campaigns see stuff, and they're much more able to figure it out than some 21-year-old, 22-year-old — my daughter's age — working on some form in a basement somewhere. The kids that work on this may not have that world experience to know what this really means when these ads get out there. You want to have seasoned people look at it. So, that means disclosure, disclaimer. Is it enough just to have these platforms do it themselves? No, and they understand that themselves, and that's why they're supporting the Honest Ads Act. We're starting to see states, individually — like New York State — put in place their own rules. Google just said in Washington State that they're not going to take any political ads because they were sued by the attorney general because Washington State was able to use existing law and say, hey, this applies to you, and they didn't quite have their platform up to date. It was nothing wrong that they'd actually done, but they didn't have their platform up to date to be able to do it. Well, that's what's gonna happen, we're gonna have this state-by-state patchwork of things going on, until we have a federal law that governs this, just like it governs TV, radio, and newspaper. So this is a very important part of this, not just for foreign interference, but to have fairness in political campaigns and transparency. So I used my time talking about that, but obviously, the other ways to take this on we've addressed, and Secretary Chertoff has addressed with the money into the Secure Elections, revamping how we look at this intervention from around the world, and one thing I didn't mention was, when you look at the bipartisan nature of this, Congressman Meadows, the head of the Freedom Caucus, has actually been leading the effort of the bill that Lankford and I have, so it's just another sign that we have to do everything we can to point to the fact that this isn't just about one party and one sour grapes.

CHERTOFF: Let me add one thing. Somebody showed me, I don't know if it's RT or Sputnik, apparently is advertising a new television show called "The United States: The Real Story," which of course is going to be the Russian view of all the problems in the United States. And it occurred to me, we have a great weapon we don't use enough, and that's our sense of humor. We are really good at satire. And if you have any doubt, watch Saturday Night Live. We ought to

look at some of what the Russians do and start laughing at it, and that would be a great way to capture the attention of some of the folks, and you know, once you've ridiculed something, it loses its potency.

KLOBUCHAR: Are you talking about when they played Putin on Saturday Night Live?

CHERTOFF: Yeah, well, that's one possibility, but I'd dial it up a little bit. But I think, you know, even some of what they're purveying now is so obviously over-the-top that I think that if you mock it, you defang it. And I think we, I'd like to invite Hollywood and some of the people who are great at writing jokes to use their talents to protect ourselves against some of these strange efforts.

MORELL: Let me come back to the high-tech sector. Both of you have touched on, what should we expect from the high-tech sector? Are they doing enough? What's the right balance between cooperation between the government and companies and regulation. How do you both think about that?

KLOBUCHAR: Well, I think that they're doing more now, and a lot of that is because of public pressure. But the fact that they oppose this simple bill — which, I promise you, is not that radical, that they have some rules of the road here — was concerning, and because of the big Cambridge Analytica and what happened and the major blowup and the major hearings that we had, they actually changed their tune and are supportive of that particular bill. But I think we need to go further, always mindful that these are some of the best companies in America with the brightest minds, and that's why I expect more of them, and they've admitted that they should be doing more and will do more, but you also have privacy issues, and Senator Kennedy and I have a bill on that, which Mark Zuckerberg, when it came to the 72-hour notice of a breach of privacy, said that we should put that out there, yes, that he would agree that that would be a kind of regulation we should have, and that we may start having to have regulations. We're going to have to be very careful, we can look at what has been happening in Europe, we can look at what's happening in other parts of the world, and try to mold it to uniquely America's set of rules, but I think we're gonna have to be doing that at the same time we look at this very focused area of political ads.

CHERTOFF: We also, I think, can use some technological help. There's a phenomenon now, which I think is being anticipated, of what they call deepfakes, and that's the ability not just to alter video, but actually audio, to simulate someone doing and saying things that are completely fabricated. And we're gonna need to have tools that enable us when something like that is posted, to determine whether it's genuine or not. I know there are people who are working on that, but this is an area where the technology community can really be helpful in unmasking efforts to manipulate us using technology.

MORELL: Let me ask about our allies. They've faced this challenge from Russia longer than we have. They've dealt with it for a long period of time. They're still under attack. How do you both think about the best way to work with them and the best way to learn the lessons that they've

learned, because in some cases, they've done a pretty good job of figuring out how to deal with this. Secretary, do you want to start.

CHERTOFF: Well, so, I was in Copenhagen last week with Anders Rasmussen, we've set up a transatlantic mission on election integrity. It is bipartisan and it has people from Europe as well as North America, including the former President of Mexico. I think there is a lot of motivation, and unfortunately there is a lot of bitter experience with what the Russians have done, particularly if you go to Central and Eastern Europe. But in many ways the test bed is the Ukraine. And I think we need to look very carefully at what goes on in the Ukraine when they have their elections in 2019 because they are a canary in a coal mine. The tactics that we see there are in some way or other applied here domestically as well as overseas. I do think we need to work in concert on this, we're all in the same boat in terms of being targets. We all have common values at stake, and whether it be through NATO or other kinds of ad-hoc groupings, I think sharing information, having a common response to this, and maybe even making sure we work together on sanctions is a way to amplify our ability to work together.

KLOBUCHAR: Yeah, I would agree with that. I was look at this quote from the U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors about Putin the CEO, about Putin's goal here, "if everything is a lie, then the biggest liar wins." And that is our goal, to defeat that kind of- that mantra basically, that disruption creates and that a lot of lies create. And I think that working with our allies at a time when we have a fragile relationship right now because of trade issues and other things on this. They are looking to us for leadership and we have to show that leadership, and that's why I'm glad we did the sanctions and I'm glad that we're starting to step up when it comes to this legislation and other things. My best example of this, having- from a state of Scandinavians, you use a lot of Scandinavian examples, but I always tell the people in my state this one because it's less partisan and political. But the Norwegian Prime Minister told Senator McCain and myself and about five other Senators when we were at the Munich Security Conference a few years ago the story about how Russia was very mad at Norway because they were putting a lot more money into fighter planes and other things to protect themselves. So they started running a bunch of stories on Russian TV about how the

Norwegian economy, which tended to be very strong over the years, was completely tanking and that they've run out of fruits and vegetables. And so what started to happen is that Russians, well-meaning Russians, would go to visit their friends and relatives in Norway and bring with them bags and bags of cucumbers and fruits and other things because they truly believed they were out of fruits and vegetables in Norway. That story hits home for people because they understand this is really a concerted effort, fake news, and it even gets to fruits and vegetables. And so, I think listening to our allies stories, telling our allies stories and then showing some leadership, and then that is, I get back to where I started, Senator McCain has talked about how every gesture matters. And it's everything from the study the Alliance has done, once that goes out, that are allies are able to say, you know what, here is a group out of America that is talking about what we're going through and relating to it itself and admitting that it's happened to themselves now. And everything from visits from members of Congress,

showing that we're tough, standing up, standing by them. I think all of that is critical, no matter how small the gesture may seem, it's going to matter right now.

MORELL: Thank you, thank you both for taking the time this morning. Ya know, I feel, I feel deeply about this issue. I share Jim Clapper's view that this is the major security challenge that I saw during my time in government. I called this the political equivalent of 9/11 when it became clear what Putin had done. This is the only time in American history, that I can think of, where we have been attacked by a nation and we haven't come together, we've actually come apart, which is remarkable to me. So this is an extraordinarily serious issue and I want to thank Senator Klobuchar for being a real leader on the Hill on this issue. And Secretary Chertoff who's been a leader in the private sector on this issue, thank you both very much and thanks for your time this morning.

KLOBUCHAR: Thanks, Mike.

Second Panel (MICHAEL MORELL, JAMIE FLY, LAURA ROSENBERGER, DAVID SALVO):

MORELL: Ok, we're now gonna switch gears a little bit, and we are gonna talk about the Alliance for Securing Democracy's recent report, "Policy Blueprint for Countering Foreign Influence in Democracies," which in my view is the single best document I've seen on the problem and the single best set of solutions that I have seen to date, so congratulations to the team for putting together a really first-rate report. Maybe the best way to start here is just really quickly go down the line and introduce yourselves so that everybody knows who's up here.

FLY: I'm Jamie Fly. I'm co-director of the Alliance. I was in the Bush Administration, the Defense Department, and NSC staff and was foreign policy advisor to Senator Marco Rubio before joining the Alliance a year ago.

ROSENBERGER: And I'm Laura Rosenberger, again, I co-direct the Alliance with Jamie. A little more of my background, I also served in the Executive Branch in the State Department and National Security Council and also served as Hillary Clinton's foreign policy advisor.

SALVO: I'm David Salvo, and I'm deputy director of the Alliance for Securing Democracy. In my previous life, I was a nonpartisan State Department official both in the Foreign Service and Civil Service.

MORELL: So let me start by asking you each a question that you probably don't expect, which is: for each of you, you could be doing something else. Why have you chosen to come together and start the Alliance? What motivated you? Why are you doing this?

FLY: So my experience actually was up here during 2016 working for Senator Rubio, who was also running for president, but I was on his Senate staff, and I saw 2016 play out both through that lense of working with a presidential candidate, and so I saw some of what we later realized was the interference going on first-hand. I saw the corrosive impact that the leaking of John

Podesta's email had on the political debate, and, having again worked on presidential campaigns and worked for politicians, I saw how damaging that could be to anyone involved in this space, and then in the aftermath I was working in the Senate for another six months or so after the election, I saw how our government really scrambled and grappled with what had unfolded, and even immediately after the election still didn't even really know what had hit us, and that really troubled me, and in the briefings I was part of, some in this basement, in another part of the basement, it was very clear that our intelligence agencies, the State Department, the NSC, the Department of Homeland Security, they were really caught off guard, and that troubled me, just as someone involved in national security, and so, when I met Laura, who was already thinking about launching this project, it really felt something that was personal to me and something I wanted get involved in.

ROSENBERGER: And my experience is somewhat similar. It actually, for me, kinda goes back to... Well, I guess, a couple of things. The first is, I went into the national security field in the wake of 9/11. I knew I wanted to go in to the public policy world but had been sort of really interested in both domestic and foreign policy, and 9/11 answered that question for me. And I went into the Bush Administration as a civil servant because you serve your country when you've come under attack, Michael, just kinda like you were saying. And so for me, I, in the wake of the attack on our country in 2016, really felt really similar, actually, to how I did after 9/11, that we had come under attack, that we had somehow missed a threat or had not fully imagined what might be coming our way, and that I felt compelled to do something about that. I had worked a little bit on trying to grapple with some of the tactics that Russia has been using Ukraine, as we heard about earlier from Secretary Chertoff, I was at the NSC at the time, and we were grappling with how to counter some of these tactics and strategies, and really having a hard time, much as Jamie noted, organizing the U.S. government around how to deal with some of these tools and tactics, and felt like we needed to do some serious work to think about how we do that in a much better way, and I felt deeply, as I mentioned earlier, that this had to be done in a bipartisan way, and so, as Jamie mentioned, we were really glad to be able to team up together and to build a great time around us, to be supported by a great advisory council of bipartisan folks like Michael and Secretary Chertoff and others, and for me, it's really that mission that's driving me forward.

SALVO: I would just add that from my perspective at the State Department, as the 2016 election was unfolding, at the time I was working for the Deputy Secretary of State, so we started seeing intelligence trickle in, and we were trying to piece together what was happening, and as policy discussions started unfolding about how do we address what we now see was a concerted nation-state operation against our election, it became clear to me that government was not particularly well-organized to deal with a threat that really touched on so many agencies' various jurisdictions, so, for me, this project was attractive because it was clear that we had to figure out how to address not only bureaucratically and organizationally how the United States government can address a problem that's not going away, but also some of the political implications that I saw from the State Department: how does a Democratic administration respond to an operation that is seemingly supporting a Republican candidate. There are all

sorts of interesting aspects of that that I thought this organization could address in a bipartisan way, so that's how I came to this project from my former perch at State.

MORELL: That's great. It makes me feel good about the future of America, right here. It really does. Let me ask one question about the threat before we get into your recommendations. You all are not just focused on Russia. You're focused on other countries as well, and I'd love to get you to talk about that a little bit.

FLY: So we, yeah, obviously we're learning the lessons of 2016 and learning from the experience of what the Russians, in particular, have been doing with so-called active measures going back to the Cold War, even, but one of the things that concerns us most is that obviously they don't have a patent on these tactics, our sense is, because of a lot of the public conversation now, other, especially authoritarian, regimes are learning from the Russian experience and seeing these vulnerabilities in American society. They're seeing the limitations of the U.S. government's ability to respond and likely adapting some of these tactics, as well. So we're focused on authoritarian interference writ large. In particular, we're most concerned about China, as the looming threat on the horizon. Certainly, China is already trying to influence our politics here in the U.S., using financial means, for the most part, to purchase political influence, but we're watching very closely, and we'll be doing more work in the coming months on looking at China's neighborhood in particular and the efforts that they're already taking there in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand, where they have moved well beyond what they're already doing here in the U.S. And that's really the concerning thing for us, is that these tools were, in many respects, sophisticated, but they also were somewhat rudimentary in terms of the way the Russians applied them in 2016. If authoritarians really want to develop these tools further, including as technology evolves, the impact will be quite damaging, even more damaging than it was in 2016, and so we're also going to be doing a line of work on China and other authoritarians.

MORELL: You guys want to add anything, or is that good? (negative response) Ok let's move to the recommendations, and I will let you guys talk about them the way you want to talk about them. I would just note that as I read them, I put them into three buckets. I put them into a "defend ourselves from what the adversary is doing" bucket, I put them into "impose costs on the adversary," right, to maybe get them to think twice about doing what they're doing, and by the way, if you put those first two together, you get the classic definition of deterrence, and then three is what we've been talking about all morning, and Secretary Chertoff really hammered home, which is: we've got to fix the divisions in our own society that are creating the openings for these foreign governments to interfere, right, so they fell into three buckets for me, but please, Laura, why don't you kick us off here and walk through the recommendations in any way you want to.

ROSENBERGER: Thanks, Michael. Yeah, so we'll kind of breeze through some of the top lines on the recommendations. If you haven't, you can grab a copy of the Executive Summary outside. We saved trees by not printing off full copies of the whole report, but you can find that on our website and download a PDF if you want to get a hard copy of the full report there. But I

think that the way you framed it is exactly right: there's really three different elements to this. And the other thing I would say is that the way we think about these recommendations, this isn't a problem that government alone can solve. It's a whole-of-society problem. That's a lesson we've really learned from our European partners and allies in the work we've been doing to look at the strategies they've developed to deal with these tactics, so that includes actions by government, of course, and there's actions at the federal level and the state level. That includes actions by the private sector, in particular the tech community, and Senator Klobuchar was very eloquent on some of the specifics there. But I also believe, my own self, that the business community writ large, American business has benefited deeply from our free market, which is, I believe, inexorably intertwined with our democratic institutions and principles, and so I believe there is a responsibility for our business community to act as custodians of democracy at a time when it's under threat. And then, the third piece is the civil society aspect of this, which really is where the question of healing these divisions, of addressing these wounds that fester, that are being exploited and really opened up by those who seek to do harm, so I would also kind of think about it in that sort of cross-society way, too. No single actor is gonna be able to solve all of these challenges, and that's why we think it's so important to think about this comprehensively. Let me see if Jamie and Dave want to jump in to kind of walk through some of the specifics in each of those.

SALVO: Sure, the other thing I would add in terms of sort of a guiding framework is that we tried to look at the range of these asymmetric tools and tactics that authoritarian governments use against us sort of under that holistic, comprehensive way, as opposed to traditionally, we tend to look at each tool individually, so a cyberattack necessitates a cyber response, or a disinformation necessitates a counternarrative. We've tried to take a broader view of how all these tactics kind of come together to achieve strategic objectives, so I think you'll see that thread throughout the various recommendations that we make. We've seemed to touch a lot on government in the previous discussion. Maybe it makes sense to walk through some of the recommendations for other audiences, I don't know if, especially with your background working with the tech sector, if you want to start there and then from there we can talk about media and civil society.

FLY: Sure, the one thing I will stress though, just to reiterate what was in the first session, and we have a recommendation there about the need to separate the politics out of this issue, and that's been something that, we are bipartisan, that we try to emphasize from the start. I think it's more important than ever, honestly, because if you look at the polling, unfortunately, many Americans, especially those on the right, do not even think, believe the Russians interfered. We will not, as a country, be able to address this challenge unless we can convince more Americans across the political spectrum that this is actually a problem because it's one thing to have bipartisan bills introduced, which is a positive first step, but to get the actual time to get things passed, to get a president and administration to take this seriously, you need more political support and political will, so we believe strongly that you need to depoliticize this issue as much as possible, and as the Republican, I always remind my Republican friends that you can believe that Donald Trump was elected completely fairly, that he and his campaign did not collude, and you can still be concerned about Russian interference. So that's something I want

to stress up front. On the non-governmental recommendations, we highlight, in particular, the need for the tech sector to be more transparent. This is primarily aimed at the social media companies. There's been slow progress, I'd say, over the last year in this area, mostly because of the good work of the Senate Intelligence Committee, forcing the tech companies to provide information both to them privately and in public to the American people. A lot more work needs to be done there. I actually think this a great opportunity related to another one of our recommendation, which is: we need to take the conversation outside the halls of Congress and outside of Washington and engage more average Americans about this issue and make it connected to their lives, and some of that, as Laura and I have done work outside of DC, there's a broader sense of concern right now in American society about social media platforms, about how they operate, about how kids use social media platforms, and a lot of this ties in about respect for privacy, and so I think this can be part of a broader conversation with our society's use of social media, our reliance on social media to get news and information, and the answer there is not necessarily European-style regulation, like we've seen from some of our European allies, which would probably not be possible in the U.S. context, but the answer really lies in the companies being more honest about how their platforms operate, and giving the users more choice about the news and information that they see and doing things like the Honest Ads Act, which was already talked about earlier. The other thing we identify related to the tech sector is we need to overcome some of the barriers to effective communication and dialogue between the government and the tech sector, I'm sure Michael dealt with this a lot in his past life. In the post-Snowden era, there's a lot of suspicion in Silicon Valley about the government. We need to overcome that to share information. There was a report in the New York Times, I think, this morning about this administration's outreach from DHS to the major social media platforms to try to coordinate on 2018, and it's good that there at least is a dialogue, but the way the report read, it raises a lot of questions about whether that was a useful exchange. The tech companies came away from that I think a bit frustrated that they weren't getting access to classified intelligence that would maybe give them some leads to look at certain information on their platforms. Meanwhile from the government side, I think, if you talked to many of the government agencies involved, they don't feel the social media platforms are always sharing as much information as they could up front, and this is part of the problem that led to the fact that here we were, months after the actual election, and basic facts were still being answered about what the Russians actually did on major platforms, and the companies weren't even producing information. Some of it is apparent they didn't even really know where to look necessarily initially on their platforms, and it was only after dialogue with the Intelligence Committee where they were able to produce a lot of the ads and trace back and figure out what had actually happened, so we need to regularize that sort of engagement between the tech sector and between the relevant executive branch agencies and the intelligence community. Otherwise, you've got two entities looking at different sets of information which are related, but not sharing, and that's just gonna lead to another failure to connect the dots going forward.

ROSENBERGER: Michael, I want to come back on one of the questions that you asked Senator Klobuchar and Secretary Chertoff, which you and I have talked about a good bit, which is are we structured right? And I want to lift out one of the, I guess two specific recommendations that we have in our report on this issue, because we don't think we're structured right, as we heard

earlier, and I think there's two things that we need to do there: one is create a senior level foreign interference coordinator who is at the National Security Council, who is empowered to, on the policy level, be coordinating both within the National Security Council and within the relevant agencies all the different pieces around this. And then the other is establishing a hybrid threat center at the Director of National Intelligence, which would obviously have a broader reach beyond just the foreign interference issues, but I think we've seen these tools and tactics be used in ways that, as we've heard consistently, we weren't able to put all the pieces together, weren't able to grapple with all of it, so those are recommendations that we've also included. And Michael, maybe I'll do something unconventional here and turn it back, actually, to invite you, just because we've had some really interesting conversations about this for some of your own observations on that point, too.

MORELL: Yeah, so this idea of are we organized right, and the answer being no, resonates with me. And this idea, you know one of the reasons why 9/11 happened was because there was a seam between foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence, and I'm struck a little bit by the fact that the same thing sort of happened here. You know, the folks who do foreign intelligence don't look at U.S. social media feeds. They just don't. It's just not part of who they are, it's not part of their mission. The folks who do that in the intelligence community, the counterintelligence folks, are cloistered. There's not a lot of sharing outside of that counterintelligence mission, and so there really does need to be this, at least in the intelligence community and I think in the policy community as well, a place where all this comes together, and that's why I like this idea of a hybrid center at the DNI, very similar to why we created the National Counterterrorism Center, right, to fill that seam. Makes perfect sense.

SALVO: Sure, I mean, we talked a lot about this in the first panel, too: the need to raise the cost on adversaries who are conducting these operations against us, and not just unilaterally raising the cost, but working with our allies, particularly in Europe, but not just in Europe, our democratic allies and partners all over the world, to essentially be singing from the same sheet of music, so we talk about the most obvious form of raising the cost, sanctions, and I believe the Senator raises in her remarks, we and the EU, in particular, need to be strengthening the sanctions regime against Russians and others who are conducting these sorts of operations together. One of our recommendations in the report is that the EU extend the amount of time that they review sanctions renewal from six months to twelve months to make it more complicated for one particular member state to break ranks, and there are other forms of raising the cost that we build into our recommendations as well, from proportionate cyber responses, to raising reputational diplomatic costs on countries like Russia, so not including them in the G7, for example, when they do not deserve to be, so there are various sorts of measures that, again, this isn't just the United States taking unilateral measures, that to the extent possible we really need to be doing this in close cooperation with our allies and partners.

MORELL: Let me just add there, and then we can maybe open it up to questions. Both the Obama Administration and the Trump Administration, largely led by Congress, have imposed costs on Vladimir Putin for what he did here, but it is absolutely clear that he has not been deterred. It is absolutely clear that he continues, so it's a finding that should shock nobody that

we have not yet imposed a high enough cost on him, and in my personal view, we need to impose a higher cost if we want to get him to think twice about what he's doing here, and just as important, if we want send the message to other countries that if you do this, you're gonna face a significant cost. Or we are gonna see more and more countries doing what Russia did, without a doubt. So I'll just add that, but let's open it up to questions, and please, stand up, wait for a microphone, and then introduce yourself and ask your question, please. Right here first.

Q&A

Question: My name is John Keller. I may be uneducated. Is there evidence that the Russians affected the outcome of the Russian presidential race in the primaries?

FLY: So there's not evidence that they affected the outcome, per se. What Special Counsel Mueller shows in his indictment is that they were engaging in similar social media, attempts at social media manipulation, starting in the primary targeted at some of the president's Republican opponents. I think it was Cruz and Rubio were the ones that Muller mentions. So this was not just aimed at Secretary Clinton. It started much earlier and so trying to sew chaos on both sides. And it's important to note too, we haven't gone through a lot of this here, we have a Twitter dashboard that monitors a number of Russian-linked accounts. And you can see that they do not just target one side or the other. I call them equal opportunity. I mean they have attacked anti-Republican material just as they have attacked Democrats on a regular basis.

Question: Good morning, David Wanger with the Office of Congressman Jim Langevin. Apart from the information that has come out of the Mueller investigation and some of the indictments about some specifics that activities the Russians have engaged in, there hasn't been a lot of information to flow out of the intelligence community or other sources about on-going activities at a nuanced level that actually inform individual decision or awareness at a societal level. Can you talk a little bit about the need for that? Is there a greater need for more information, more intelligence, about the actual nature of these influence campaigns to go into the hands of individuals, the obstacles to that, maybe the balance of roles between the private sector and the government on that aspect.

ROSENBERGER: That's an excellent question, thank you for raising it. We absolutely believe that there needs to be more transparency around these issues. And I think that comes from a couple of different quarters, right? One of them is the intelligence community. The intelligence community does a number of public reports you know every, on an annual basis. The worldwide threat assessment and others. There are some interesting models if you look to our European allies. So like the Estonian Intelligence service produces a really detailed report on an annual basis that goes into a lot of detail about the attacks that have been coming from Russia and elsewhere against Estonia in this space. Sweden does a similar kind of report. And the theory there is that a lot of that kind of transparency and information is really important for building resiliency in the population. Which is really important to creating the resistance to these attacks. As Jamie, or as somebody, I think Jamie, said: It's never going to stop. This activity has been going on for decades. It's been hyper-charged by cyber-means, but part of this has to be

building resiliency. So that, that's part of it. I think the transparency piece there, as much as the intel community can do on that, is really important. But then there's also the tech sector piece of this, right. A lot of what we do know, even just about the retrospective activity that's happened on social media for instance, is because of the Congressional investigations that have sort of compelled the social media platforms to release this information. And we have called in our report for much greater transparency as Jamie mentioned from the tech community on the kinds of things they are seeing on their platforms. But again really being important to creating an educated citizenry and build that resiliency you know. The last piece that I would say on this is that I think that there is an element of this that our media can help with as well. We often see unfortunately the very polarized characterization of this topic in the media. And we have a set of recommendations in our report that are about how the media can both better inform people about the substance of these disinformation campaigns, about the interference operations, but also to ensure that they are not becoming inadvertent amplifiers of this as well. We unfortunately saw in the 2016 context but also even last week, there was a CNN report that looked at some of the recent Twitter handles that had been identified as internet research agency accounts, and found that news agencies continue to cite fake accounts operated by the internet research agency and characterize them, you know these people are accounts pretending to be Americans. So we have press accounts citing them as if they are legitimate Americans believe that they are. So we need to make sure that we have mechanisms in place in our journalistic and recording rooms to make sure we don't inadvertently amplify that as well.

MORELL: You know, as the, as the intel guy here, let me say a couple of things. One is that I don't see any reason why the intelligence community couldn't do it. I don't think there are significant sources or methods issues here that would prevent that. But the second thing I would say is that it is not for the intelligence community itself to decide whether to be transparent. It's really a policy call; it's really a White House policy call. And I think Congress can be helpful in that regard. I don't see why the Senate Intelligence Committee couldn't invite the leadership of the intelligence committee to an open hearing to talk about this and then see how the White House responds.

Question: Katarina Sadova, recently from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Great report, thank you for your hard work. A couple of questions. One is that I notice that there isn't much discussion about the importance of instilling critical thinking and identifying the highly emotional content that is frequently used in disinformation campaigns. What are your thoughts on funding for education programs starting from very early on in order to really see what's next and what's coming next because the problem obviously is not going away. And another question is: you mentioned that the seams between these issues is really what is at the heart of the problem and to this day we have a very siloed understanding of cybersecurity and information operations, with good reasons. What are your thoughts on how to cut across these seams?

SALVO: Thank you for those questions. Those are excellent questions and we actually do get at, especially you first point, and the need to essentially educate the citizenry on how to be critical consumers of information, how to critically consume the news. This is extremely

important. So the Russians and others have taken advantage essentially of our hyper-partisan media environment, the echo chambers online. We put an emphasis in our report on programs that support media literacy and civics education. There are a number of organizations across states that are already working on these issues. We need more support from Washington for those programs, we need, there are lots of great models for how these programs work in many European countries that we should be looking at for examples of how we can build those programs into either our public education curriculum here in the states or just through NGOs work to promote better consumption, not to teach people how to read the news but give them the tools to make their own choices and their own decision critically, think critically about you know how to, when they see something on social media that maybe looks like it's a, you know, bogus link and it is actually disinformation they can figure that out on themselves as opposed to have someone help with that. So you raise a really important point and it does feature in some of our practical recommendations in the report.

ROSENBERGER: I'll just briefly on the seams question. I mean that's exactly why both on the policy side with someone at the national Security Council and on the Intelligence side with some kind of hybrid threat center. We think both of those would be mechanism and would be able to cut across those seams and look at the challenges in a creative way. The other piece that I think is important is that when we talk about partners and allies we think that we should really be creating mechanisms, essentially a coalition of democracies to be standing together on these issues. Mechanisms for better threat sharing and best practices so that we can actually be learning from each other in a more real time and scrutinized basis.

Question: *inaudible* the state department. I wonder if you'll comment on two, two aspects. First is, our tech companies are enabling authoritarian regimes mass surveillance rather than targeted surveillance. Is there anything that we can do to begin to help our tech companies begin to understand what they are enabling, and to begin to put a firewall policy wise so that they don't enable security regimes to monitor their own citizens? Second, if we want to get at Putin's Achilles heel, we would start at beneficial ownership transparency in the U.S. If you want, you know, 99 percent of Russians to be on your side, show them the stolen money that is hidden away in real estate and LLC's anonymously owned here. Is there a way that we can do that?

FLY: I'll address the first question, and Laura can address beneficial ownership. I completely agree with you, I mean the challenge is that the tech companies are focused on the bottom line. And many of them, while they've allowed their platforms here in the U.S. to be used in this way by authoritarians, are jockeying to make sure they have access to the Chinese market for instance. And we talked earlier about the China challenge looming on the horizon. So I think, and some politicians have started to point this out, my former boss Senator Rubio has spoken about this a number of times and highlighted what Facebook and others, some of the compromises they're making to continue to allow themselves to at least have some kind of dialogue with the Chinese. So I think it's really troubling. At the end of the day, I think they're only going to respond to market pressure. That's where it gets to a whole society approach. And if more and more Americans are concerned about this fact and the way the companies are

operating and decide to either stop using them or to put pressure on them and to encourage advertisers to not purchase ads from them, I don't think much is going to change. And that gets back to the broader awareness phrasing point. I think the tech companies have started to make some reforms but I still think they haven't gone anywhere near where they need to go. And my one fear, this is my personal view, I still see in a lot of these major social media company response too much focus on PR, on gauzy advertising – we've not all seen on TV and on the platforms themselves, rather than really focusing on how the platforms operate and what changes need to be made in terms of their policies to address the problem. But again that's not going to come about through regulation here in the U.S., it's only going to come about through market pressure, through the users deciding they've had enough and that they don't want to be manipulated in this way and speaking out more and so I think that's ultimately what needs to happen.

ROSENBERGER: You teed me out perfectly on the beneficial ownership piece because that's the one recommendation we really haven't gotten into. Which is, part of what we think is we need to think about what are our own advantages in this space, right. We often get the question: should we use the same kind of tactics to hit back at Putin that he hits us with? And my own view is, you know, if securing our democracy is our goal then engaging in a race to the bottom of truth is not actually going to be helpful in practice, actually detrimental to our goal. What we need to do is define out own advantages and define steps we can take that actually strengthen democracy. And anti-corruption measure have the benefit of both strengthening democracy and hurting Vladimir Putin. And so beneficial ownership legislation is one of a number of recommendations that we include in our report on ways that we can sort of expose and target some of Putin's ill-gotten gains that is, as you rightly put, is his Achilles Heel. On the beneficial ownership, there are a number of different pieces of legislation that have already been introduced in Congress, and it's really a matter of political will. It's really a matter of political will and again, to Jamie's point, similarly here. This is a place where bottom-up pressure is going to be really necessary to move our political leadership to take the necessary steps to close those loopholes as well as a number of other areas where we can, you know, make sure there are not spaces in our financial system that are proving prous in the same ways some of our tech vulnerabilities have proven porous.

MORELL: Thank you, thank you all. Dave, Jaime, Laura, thank you for your report. Thank you very much for what you do every day given the importance of this issue. And thanks all of you for spending your morning with us.